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The Scapegoat: EMTALA and Emergency Department Overcrowding
Abstract

Part I of this article briefly discusses the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act's salient
provisions. Part II examines the history of emergency care and changes in healthcare organization and finance
affecting the provision of charity care-topics which are significant in unraveling the alleged effects EMTALA
has had on the healthcare system. Part III examines policy issues raised by EMTALA within our present
system of health insurance and healthcare organization and finance.
This article reaches two conclusions. First, EMTALA, while a poor and archaic fit with our present system of
healthcare delivery and finance, in fact has helped to preserve our largely private, voluntary system of
healthcare. Second, EMTALA is not likely a major culprit in the financial woes of private hospitals and in ED
overcrowding and closures. Rather, greater pressures on the healthcare system, pressures that EMTALA itself
was meant in part to address, are to blame. To solve these problems, U.S. policy regarding the nature and
provision of healthcare itself must be reformed. While there are a number of minor measures concerning
issues of finance and capacity that could be implemented to improve access to emergency care without
requiring significant changes, a real solution may require greater public financing and control of health
insurance, and the creation of incentives to expand emergency capacity in at least some settings.
Keywords

Emergency medical services, Hospitals--Emergency services
Disciplines

Health Law and Policy | Medical Jurisprudence

This article is available at Mitchell Hamline Open Access: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/facsch/414

THE SCAPEGOAT: EMTALA AND EMERGENCY
DEPARTMENT OVERCROWDING
LauraD. Hermer*

INTRODUCTION

There is one method of accessing healthcare in the United
States that is available to each and every person therein, regardless
of citizenship, wealth, race, ethnicity, gender, or insurance status.
Under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
(EMTALA), most hospitals with an emergency department (ED)
are obliged under federal law to screen every person who seeks
emergency medical attention, without regard to his ability to pay.'
If the person is found to have an emergency condition that could
result in serious bodily harm or death if left untreated, the hospital
has a further duty to take whatever measures are necessary to
stabilize the individual, again without regard to his ability to pay.2
Viewed from at least one perspective, the goals of EMTALA
are admirable. Congress enacted EMTALA in 1986 as a response
to perceived widespread patient dumping by private EDs, often
onto public EDs. 3 Public hospitals, which often rely on significant
local and state subsidies for funding, traditionally have a mandate
* Research

Professor, Health Law and Policy Institute, Assistant Visiting

Professor, University of Houston Law Center, and Visiting Professor, Institute
for the Medical Humanities, University of Texas Medical Branch. The author is
grateful to the Institute for the Medical Humanities for its generous support
during her appointment as a Visiting Scholar at the Institute, during which time
the article was written, and to Bill Winslade, Kirk Smith and Lars Cisek for their
useful comments and support.
l See infra note 20 and associated text.
2 See infra notes 25-26 and associated
text.
3 See infra note 67 and associated text.
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to care for patients without ability to pay.4 They chiefly care for
patients with public insurance sources, usually Medicaid and
Medicare, and the uninsured. The transfer of uninsured patients to5
public EDs went on for years prior to EMTALA's passage. 6
Nevertheless, the practice may have increased in the early 1980s
due at least in part to new payment limits on federal and state
health coverage programs. 7 Faced with reduced Medicare
reimbursements in relation to costs, particularly for ED care,
private hospitals sought to treat fewer public-pay and uninsured
patients in their EDs.8
In 1984 and 1985, the press seized upon the issue. Numerous
articles were published providing anecdotal evidence of patient
dumping. 9 Many of these articles described incidents in which
See, e.g., Phyllis E. Bernard, Privatization of Rural Public Hospitals:
Implicationsfor Access andIndigent Care, 47 MERCER L. REv. 991, 999 (1996);
4

JENNIFER HUANG ET AL., AMERICA'S PUBLIC HOSPITALS AND HEALTH SYSTEMS:

2003
1
(2003),
available
at
http://www.naph.org/Content/ContentGroups/Publications1/NAPH_2003_Hospi
talCharacteristicsSurvey.pdf(last visited Feb. 14, 2006).
5 Cases document the existence of the practice, although how widespread
it
was appears to have been largely unquantified prior to the 1980s. See, e.g., Le
Jeune Road Hosp., Inc. v. Watson, 171 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1965); New Biloxi v.
Frazier, 146 So. 2d 882 (Miss. 1962); Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 174
A.2d 175 (Del. 1961); O'Neil v. Montefiore Hosp., 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1960).
See also, e.g., Helen Creighton, Your Legal Risks in Emergency Care, 8
NURSING 52 (1978); J. F. Horty, Emergency Care-orLack of It-Can Make a
GeneralHospitalLiable, 96 MODERN HOSPITAL 103 (Mar. 1961).
6 See, e.g., R.L. Schiff et al., Transfers to a Public Hospital:A Prospective

Study of467 Patients,314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 552 (1986).

See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97248, 96 Stat. 324 (codified in relevant part at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (2003)).
8 For information and further citations concerning the increased financial
risk that hospitals had to absorb following the implementation of the DRG
system, see Eric Munoz et al., Source of Admission and Cost: Public Hospitals
Face FinancialRisk, 76 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 696 (1986).
9 See, e.g., Peter Alshire, Indigent Healthcare Issue Takes Spotlight,
OAKLAND TRIBUNE, Dec. 29, 1985; Paul Saltzman, Court Says Hospital Must
Accept Indigent, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 20, 1985, at Al; Richard Saltus, Activists
Call for Laws Insuring Hospital Care of Indigents, BOSTON GLOBE, July 7,
1985, at B5; Bard Lindeman, Some Hospitals Turn Away Uninsured Patients,
MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 22, 1985, at D2; Abigail Trafford, Hospitals: A Sick
7
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uninsured patients suffered severe injuries or died because of
lengthy delays due to the shuffling from hospital to hospital before
finally ending up at a public ED.' 0 At the same time, two studies
were published that helped quantify both the phenomenon and
effects of patient dumping in two urban areas." Because of the
perception of a significant problem, Congress enacted EMTALA
in 1986.
Since its enactment, particularly in the years since the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) began enforcing it
more vigorously, EMTALA has been controversial among
physicians, hospitals and healthcare attorneys. Numerous articles
discuss the sources of controversy, most notably, the interpretation
of related regulations and case law, and the role that EMTALA has
allegedly played in contributing
to ED overcrowding and closures
2
enactment.'
its
since
Industry, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 18, 1985, at 39; Vicky Cahan, When
the Patient Can't Pay the Medical Bill, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 18, 1985, at 59;
Richard A. Knox, Health Policy: Some Local Hospitals Dump the Uninsured,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 6, 1984; Elizabeth Fee, The Second Sickness:
Contradictions of Capitalist Healthcare, MONTHLY REV., Feb. 1, 1984, at 49;
Marc Fisher, Mayor: Hospital "Dumped" AIDS Victim, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 9,
1983, at Al.
10 See, e.g., 131 CONG. REC. E942 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1985) (statement of
Rep. Garcia, detailing an article published in the Wall Street Journal); Knox,
supra note 9.
11 David U. Himmelstein et al., Patient Transfers: Medical Practice as
Social Triage, 74 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 494, 495 (1984); R.L. Schiff et al., supra
note 6.
12 See, e.g., Sarah Rosenbaum & Brian Kamoie, Finding a Way Through
the HospitalDoor: The Role of EMTALA in Public Health Emergencies, 31 J. L.
MED. & ETHICS 590 (2003); Robert A. Wanerman, The EMTALA Paradox,40
ANN. EMERG. MED. 464 (2002); Loren A. Johnson et al., The Emergency
Department On-Call Backup Crisis: Finding Remedies for a Serious Public
Health Problem, 37 ANN. EMERG. MED. 495 (2001); Wendy W. Bera,
Preventing "Patient Dumping:" The Supreme Court Turns Away the Sixth
Circuit's Interpretationof EMTALA, 38 Hous. L. REV. 616 (1999); David A.
Hyman, Patient Dumping and EMTALA: Past Imperfect/Future Shock, 8
HEALTH MATRIX 29 (1998); Arthur L. Kellerman et al., Access of Medicaid
Recipients to Outpatient Care, 330 N. ENG. J. MED. 1426 (1994); Diana K.
Falstrom, Decisions Under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act: A Judicial Cure for Patient Dumping, 19 N. KY. L. REV. 365 (1992).
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Less discussed, however, is EMTALA's status as a throwback
to a previous era of charity care, and its role within the larger U.S.
healthcare system. By mandating potentially uncompensated care,
EMTALA effectively represents a partial federal codification of
what was previously a voluntary undertaking by physicians and
hospitals, made financially feasible through what used to be 13a
relatively flexible and multi-tiered reimbursement system.
EMTALA, which has been called the "safety net of the safety
net,"'1 4 became necessary because of a number of diverse factors
that experienced significant changes in the twenty years or so
preceding its enactment. These factors include radical changes in
healthcare organization and finance following the enactment of
Medicare and Medicaid in 1965,15 governmental action concerning
issues of race and poverty in the provision of healthcare,' 6 and,
most notably, a sharp and steady increase in the number of
uninsured Americans.' 7 EMTALA exists, in effect, to help support
our private and non-universal system of healthcare, based on a
notion of charity care that is far more tenuous in today's healthcare
market than at the time of the statute's enactment. 18 Yet its support
can no longer secure this country's continued failure to move to a
system of universal access, even in conjunction with public
healthcare programs.
Part I of this Article briefly discusses EMTALA's salient
provisions. Part II examines the history of emergency care and
changes in healthcare organization and finance affecting the
provision of charity care-topics which are significant in
unraveling the alleged effects EMTALA has had on the healthcare
system. Part III examines policy issues raised by EMTALA within
our present system of health insurance and healthcare organization
13

See infra Section III.A.

14

Peter Cunningham & Jessica May, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTHCARE

No. 70: Insured Americans Drive Surge in Emergency
Department Visits, available at http://hschange.org/CONTENT/613 (last visited
May 8, 2006).
15See infra notes 61-64 and associated text.
16 See infra notes 73-80 and associated text.
17 See infra notes 69-72 and associated text.
18 See infra Section III.A.
CHANGE, ISSUE BRIEF
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and finance. It reaches two conclusions. First, EMTALA, while a
poor and archaic fit with our present system of healthcare delivery
and finance, in fact has helped to preserve our largely private,
voluntary system of healthcare. Second, EMTALA is not likely a
major culprit in the financial woes of private hospitals and in ED
overcrowding and closures. Rather, greater pressures on the
healthcare system, pressures that EMTALA itself was meant in
part to address, are to blame. To solve these problems, U.S. policy
regarding the nature and provision of healthcare itself must be
reformed. While there are a number of minor measures concerning
issues of finance and capacity that could be implemented to
improve access to emergency care without requiring significant
changes, a real solution may require greater public financing and
control of health insurance, and the creation of incentives to
expand emergency capacity in at least some settings.

I. EMTALA's PROVISIONS
Congress enacted EMTALA in response to a growing public
perception of patient dumping in the early and mid-1980s.
EMTALA applies to all hospitals with an ED that have a federal
contract to provide Medicare services.' 9 As virtually all hospitals
with an ED also have a contract with the federal government to
provide services to Medicare enrollees, the statute therefore applies
to treatment at virtually all EDs. The statute requires EDs at all
covered hospitals to screen all ED patients who request treatment
(or for whom treatment is requested by another party) for an
"emergency medical condition." 2 0 An emergency medical
condition exists when the absence of immediate medical attention
may be expected to result in the patient's death or serious harm to
2
either a major bodily function or body part. 1
19 Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) Pub.
L. No. 99-272, Title IX, § 9121, 100 Stat. 164 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395dd (1988 & Supp. 1992)).
20 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a). All hospitals that accept Medicare as
payment are included under the statute.
21 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1); see also 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(b) (West 2005). It
also pertains to a woman in labor, where there is not enough time to affect a safe
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When screening the patient, the ED staff must adhere to the
same policy it uses in screening any other patient. 22 For example, it
may not lawfully screen an unconscious homeless man differently
than it would anyone else with similar symptoms. Nor may the ED
lawfully delay screening to inquire about the individual's ability to
pay. 23 If the medical personnel who screen the patient find no
emergency medical condition, then EMTALA imposes no
obligation2 upon
the ED or its staff to provide the patient with any
4
treatment.

However, if the patient is found to have an emergency medical
condition, the ED staff must "stabilize" his condition before
transferring or discharging him.25 Stabilization entails taking

transfer to another hospital prior to delivery, or where such a transfer would
place the life or safety of the woman or fetus in jeopardy.
22 Id. EMTALA does not prescribe any national standard for evaluation or
treatment. See, e.g., Baber v. Hospital Corp. of America, 977 F.2d 872, 878, 880
(4th Cir. 1992) (holding that "EMTALA only requires hospitals to apply their
standard screening procedure ... uniformly to all patients" and noting with
respect to screening examinations that Congress "could have clearly specified a
national standard," had it wished to do so).
23 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(h).
24 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(c) (West 2005)
If an individual comes to a hospital's dedicated emergency department
and a request is made on his or her behalf for examination or treatment
for a medical condition, but the nature of the request makes it clear that
the medical condition is not of an emergency nature, the hospital is
required only to perform such screening as would be appropriate for
any individual presenting in that manner, to determine that the
individual does not have an emergency medical condition.
Id. Note additionally that concern regarding medical malpractice issues, which
are wholly separate from EMTALA, may nevertheless counsel that ED staff
provide a patient with instructions to consult a physician regarding any nonemergent condition that the screening examination may turn up, or with other
orders for treatment or follow-up care.
25 EMTALA only requires an ED to provide care sufficient to stabilize the
patient. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1)(A) (providing that a hospital must
provide, "within the staff and facilities available at the hospital, for such further
medical examination and such treatment as may be required to stabilize the
medical condition"). In the case of a woman in labor, "stabilization" means
delivery of both the fetus and the placenta. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A).
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whatever medical measures are available and necessary to ensure
that the individual's medical condition will not materially
deteriorate during or as a result of transfer from the facility. 26 A
hospital may forego stabilization and instead transfer an
unstabilized patient with an emergency medical condition only if
the patient herself requests a transfer in writing or a physician or
other authorized medical personnel certifies in writing that the
benefits to the patient of treatment elsewhere outweigh the risks of
transfer.27
Physicians and hospitals that violate EMTALA's provisions
are liable for up to $50,000 in civil penalties per violation by the
federal Office of the Inspector General (OIG). 8 In egregious cases,
the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) may also
terminate offenders from participation in Medicare, although this
rarely happens. 29 The statute also provides for a private right of
action, so a patient harmed by an EMTALA violation may also sue
a participating hospital.3 °
26

42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A).

A patient is considered stable for discharge (vs. for transfer from one
facility to a second facility) when, within reasonable clinical
confidence, it is determined that the patient has reached the point where
his/her continued care, including diagnostic work-up, treatment, or
both, could be reasonably performed as an outpatient or later as an
inpatient, provided the patient is given a plan for appropriate follow-up
care with the discharge instructions.
Id. Loren A. Johnson et al., The Emergency Department On-Call Backup Crisis:
Finding Remedies for a Serious Public Health Problem, 37 ANN. EMERGENCY
MED. 495, 495-499 (May 2001) (quoting HCFA, EMTALA STATE OPERATIONS
MANUAL Tag A 407 (1998)).
27 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1)(A). In the latter case, the hospital must provide
appropriate transportation, and must include all relevant medical records.
28 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1).
29 Id. Between 1986 and 2001, only four hospitals have been terminated
from Medicare for EMTALA violations, and two of those four were later
reinstated. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMERGENCY CARE: EMTALA
IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT ISSUES 3 (June 2001), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01747.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2006)
[hereinafter GAO, EMERGENCY CARE].

42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A). This private right of action does not
include the right to sue physicians or other healthcare providers for alleged
3'
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II. EMERGENCY CARE IN HISTORICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CONTEXT

To understand the issues posed by EMTALA, some
background is necessary. First, a brief history of the provision of
emergency medicine in this country is necessary to better evaluate
the origins of some of the problems often blamed on EMTALA.
Second, it is necessary to look briefly at changes in healthcare
organization and finance that have allowed providers increasingly
less leeway to shift costs from the uninsured and poorly insured to
the well insured and wealthy. The actual amount of uncompensated
care provided by EDs at most voluntary and for-profit hospitals is
small, even post-EMTALA. 31 Nevertheless, the perception of
providers is that uncompensated care, presumably to the poor, is
ruining their hospitals. This perception is likely caused in part
because of restrictions on providers' ability to cost-shift in
response to the federal mandate to provide care, even if
uncompensated, to people with unstable emergency conditions
who present at the ED.32 Thus, EMTALA's "unfunded mandate"
becomes a target for providers' ire in an increasingly pinched
system.
A. A BriefHistory of Emergency Care
At the end of the nineteenth century, EDs as we know them
today did not exist. The majority of healthcare was provided at that
33
time by physicians, most of whom delivered care via house-calls.
As the quality and efficacy of allopathic medical care improved
and patients increasingly sought allopathic medical care,
physicians made fewer house-calls, instead requiring their patients
to travel to them.3 4 Meanwhile, with the rise of aseptic technique

EMTALA violations. See id.
31 See infra note 43 and associated text.
32 See infra Section II.B.
33 See, e.g., PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN

MEDICINE 68-71 (1982).
34 Id. at 75-77.
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and anesthesia, surgical care grew increasingly common.35 The
need for hospitals as a locus of surgical practice and patient
recovery grew correspondingly.
For much of the twentieth century, there were two primary
types of hospitals: public and private nonprofit.3 6 Public hospitals
are institutions funded by the local government for the purpose of
providing healthcare for impoverished and underserved county
residents.3 7 Such hospitals, usually based in larger metropolitan
areas, have provided the lion's share of care over the last century
to the indigent and, in more recent decades, the uninsured. Public
hospitals continue to form an essential piece of the nation's safety
net. In 2003, 60% of patients receiving care at public hospitals
nationwide were either uninsured or had Medicaid as their source
of insurance, and 43% of8 net public hospital revenues came from
these two payer sources.3
Private nonprofit hospitals, on the other hand, both could, and
today still do, discriminate amongst potential patients, whether
(formerly) on the basis of race or ethnicity, or (both formerly and
presently) on the perceived or actual ability to pay.39 In 2004, 61%
of all community hospitals in the United States were private
nonprofit hospitals, each operating in different environments and
possessing different missions. 40 Generally, they provide care to far

35

Id. at 156-57.

36

ROSEMARY STEVENS, IN SICKNESS AND IN WEALTH 8-10 (1989). For-

profit hospitals existed, but treated a relatively small number of patients. Id. at

20.
37
38

See HUANG ET AL., supra note 4, at 1-2, 10.
Id. at 8, 12. Note that gross charges for Medicaid accounted for 32

percent of gross public hospital charges in 2003, whereas Medicaid accounted

for 37 percent of net public hospital revenues in the same year. Id. at 12. The
disparity is due to the subsidies that public hospitals, among others, receive from
Medicaid through disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments. DSH
payments complicate comparisons with private hospital revenues, short of
receiving more precise and detailed data.
39 STEVENS, supra note 36, at 137-38, 310.
40 See Fast Facts from AHA
Hospital Statistics (2005), AMERICAN
HOSPITAL
ASS'N,
available at http://www.aha.org/aha/resourcecenter/
fastfacts/fastfactsUS hospitals.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2006).
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fewer uninsured and Medicaid patients than do public hospitals. 4 '
The American Hospital Association's data for 2003 indicates that
only 16% of respondent hospitals' gross revenues (including both
nonprofit and for-profit private hospitals) came from Medicaid or
uninsured patients, with the remainder coming from privately
insured and Medicare patients. 42 In contrast to the public hospitals'
rate of 21%, private hospitals provided uncompensated care
equivalent only to about 5% of their gross revenues in 2003. 43
Prior to EMTALA, a minority of states already mandated that
hospitals provide care in genuine emergencies regardless of a
patient's ability to pay. In some states, this rule was set by statute.
In 1927, Illinois was the first state to enact a law providing that all
licensed hospitals must provide emergency medical care to those
who present with an emergent condition. 4 A minority of other
states followed suit over the next fifty years.45 Where actual
legislation did not exist, the common law sometimes filled the gap.
In Wilmington General Hospital v. Manlove, the Delaware
Supreme Court held that where a hospital emergency room refused
to treat an ill child who died shortly thereafter, a hospital could be
liable for refusing care in an "unmistakable emergency. ' " 6 A
41 Voluntary

hospitals in academic teaching centers do provide more
uncompensated care, on average, than other voluntary hospitals; however, they
still provide far less than public hospitals. See, e.g., Joel S. Weissman et al.,
Hospitals' Care of Uninsured Patients During the 1990s: The Relation of
Teaching Status and Managed Care to Changes in Market Share and Market
Concentration,40 INQUIRY 84, 89 (2003).
42 The Fragile State of Hospital Finances, AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASS'N 6,
available
at
http://www.ahapolicyforum.org/ahapolicyforum/resources/
content/FragileStateChartPack.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
43 See HUANG ET AL, supra note 4, at 1; see also Joel S. Weissman et al.,
supra note 41, at 89 (providing earlier data). Notably, private hospitals serving
as a "flagship" hospital for a medical school provided more uncompensated care
than the norm among private hospitals (6.7 percent, as compared with less than
5 percent for other private hospitals). Id.
44 MARGUERITE R. MANCINI & ALICE T. GALE, EMERGENCY CARE AND THE
LAW 50 (Aspen 1981). But see Schiff et al., supranote 6 (demonstrating that, at
least in one part of Illinois, the statute apparently had little effect).
45 MANCINI & GALE, supranote 44, at 50.
46 54 Del. 15, 23 (1961).
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number of other jurisdictions followed a version of this rule in
ensuing years. 47
With the rise of surgical specialties and hospital-based care,
and a correlating decline in house-calls and after-hours care
provided by individual physicians, patients increasingly sought
care for urgent and emergency medical conditions at hospitals.
Additionally, the development of modem, dedicated emergency
rooms, staffed around the clock, at hospitals beginning in the
1960s further encouraged this trend. 48 These factors helped give
rise to the use of EDs as places in which to obtain routine
ambulatory medical care during off-hours, when both the patient
and her regular physician were off work.49 Correspondingly, the
rise in ED use has outstripped the population growth for 50five
decades now - significantly longer than EMTALA's existence.
B. Changes in Reimbursement Affecting Uncompensated Care
Over the past five decades, healthcare finance underwent
several dramatic changes that affected the provision of emergency
care. First, by the mid-1950s, many Americans had obtained
private employment-based health insurance to cover hospital and
physician care rather than paying out of pocket. 5 1 These policies
often paid for emergency medical care as part of hospital care,
47

See, e.g., Guerrero v. Copper Queen Hosp., 112 Ariz. 104, 106 (1975);

Stanturf v. Sipes, 447 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. 1969); Le Juene Road Hosp., Inc. v.
Watson, 171 So. 2d 202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Barcia v. Society of New
York Hosp., 241 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1963).
48 See, e.g., Daniel F. Danzl & Benson S. Munger, History of Academic
Emergency Medicine, SOC'Y FOR ACAD. EMERGENCY MED., available at
http://www.saem.org/publicat/chapl.htm (last visited May 8, 2006).
49 See, e.g., Howard R. Kelman & Dorothy S. Lane, Use of the Hospital
Emergency Room in Relation to the Use of Private Physicians, 66 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1189, 1191 (1976) (finding that 51 percent of suburban individuals
seeking care in EDs had a regular primary care physician (PCP), but came to the
ED because the physician was not available at the time that care was needed,
and that a further 15 percent were referred by their PCP because they needed
services that the PCP did not offer).
50 See infra note 114 and associated text.
5' See STARR, supra note 33, at 338.
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making a visit to the ED financially feasible as well as

convenient. 52 Hospitals and physicians were largely free to
determine the amount they charged their patients.5 3 This permitted
them to "overcharge" wealthy patients and charge a more modest
fee to middle-income patients in order to provide a reduced fee or
charity care for their most impoverished patients.54 As long as
hospitals were able to attract a sufficiently high proportion of
moneyed patients, they could afford to provide a certain amount of

charity care to the indigent.
Even with the ability to charge patients different prices
according to ability to pay, private hospitals, even voluntary
hospitals, provided only a small amount of charity care in the early
1900s. 5 5 Still, such charity care, which totaled the equivalent of 9
to 15% of gross revenues in value according to certain local
estimates, was much higher than that found nationwide by the
latter part of the century. In 1980, one study found that the value of
free or uncompensated care totaled the equivalent of less than 5%
of the gross receipts of voluntary hospitals for that year, as
compared with about 20% for public hospitals. 56 Although studies
52

Cf Danzl & Munger, supra note 48 (observing that health insurance in

its early decades, as in the Blue Cross model, covered hospital care rather than
physician office visits, and attributing this fact as a factor in the dramatic rise in
ED use from the 1950s through 1970).
53 See, e.g., STARR, supra note 33, at 375-78.
14 See, e.g., STEVENS, supra note 36, at 108.
55 For example, in San Francisco in 1922, only 9 percent of the patient days
in voluntary hospitals were provided free of charge; 77 percent were full pay
and the remainder were paid in part. See STEVENS, supra note 36, at 107 (citing
EMERSON & PHILIPS, HOSPITALS AND HEALTH AGENCIES OF SAN FRANCISCO 48

(1923)). In Illinois in 1917, 77 percent of patients paid the full fee, whereas 15
percent paid nothing and 9 percent paid only part of their charges. Id. at 32
(citing STATE OF ILLINOIS, REPORT OF THE HEALTH INSURANCE COMMISSION OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 85, 87 (1919)).

56 Drew E. Altman & Douglas H. Morgan, The Role of State and Local
Government in Health, 2 HEALTH AFFAIRS 7, 13 (1983) (citing Jack Hadley et

al., Carefor the Poor and HospitalFinancialStatus: Results of a 1980 Survey of
Hospitals in Large Cities, URBAN INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER NO. 144402

(1983)). See also Frank A. Sloan et al., Identifying the Issues: A Statistical
Profile, in UNCOMPENSATED HOSPITAL CARE: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 23

(Samuel H. Boyer et al, eds., 1986) (finding similar results). But note that some
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have shown slight fluctuations, the present value of
uncompensated care for private hospitals (including for-profits)
57
remains at the equivalent of about 4.5 to 5% of gross receipts.
As a second significant change, Medicare and Medicaid,
enacted in 1965, provided coverage to the elderly and the
"deserving" poor-two groups that previously had often had
limited access to healthcare.58 As with private health insurance,
Medicare and Medicaid afforded ED access, thus increasing the
spectrum and number of individuals who could seek care at an ED
and reasonably expect to obtain it. 59 Medicare further reimbursed
at the rate charged by each individual provider. 60 One would
expect that hospitals' ability to provide emergency care to all
comers would correspondingly rise with an increase in the pool of
paying patients obtaining care on a fee-for-service basis. This is
not, however, ultimately how Medicare, in particular, affected the
provision of uncompensated care in EDs.
Rather, in 1983, facing skyrocketing medical costs, the federal
government implemented the Medicare Prospective Payment
System. 6 This system set Medicare's compensation according to a
complex system of reimbursement, based on diagnosis related
groups (DRGs).62 The inception of the DRG system was the
beginning of the end of the prior system in which providers
charged their patients differing amounts based in part on ability to
pay, as it capped the upper end for charges. Medicare
reimbursement fluctuated and in most years rose at a lower rate
researchers in the Lewin Group, among others, observe that calculating
provision of charity care can vary from state to state, so any national data should
be taken with some skepticism. See, e.g., Lawrence S. Lewin & Timothy J.
Eckels, Setting the Record Straight, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED. (1988); Gary
Claxton et al., Public Policy Issues in Nonprofit Conversions: An Overview, 16
HEALTH AFFAIRS 9, 15 (1997).
57 See supra note 43 and associated text.
58 See, e.g., Theodore Marmor & Jonathan Oberlander, Rethinking
MedicareReform, 17 HEALTH AFFAIRS 52, 60 (1998).
59 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395f(d)(1); 1395n(b)(1) (West 2005).
60 See, e.g, STARR, supra note 33, at 375.
61 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248
(codified in relevant part at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww).
62 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(a), (b) (West 2006).
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than medical inflation generally. 63 With managed care's
ascendance and a corresponding decline in fee-for-service
medicine, insurers, meanwhile, often contracted with providers to
reimburse at a certain percentage above the Medicare
reimbursement. 64 As a result, providers lost a degree of their prior
ability to engage in fee-shifting. Compounding this problem, the
federal government implemented rules requiring that providers
refrain from discounting a significant percentage of their nonMedicare business, and penalized providers for discounting or
writing off the patient-provided portion of their Medicare fees if
they failed to provide a corresponding discount on the
government's portion of the fee. 65 While both issues have
subsequently been clarified or revised to give providers greater
leeway in providing discounts to patients with less ability to pay,
they arguably contributed to the chilling effect Medicare generally
had on fee shifting. 66 With less latitude to shift fees, providers had
63

See National Health Expenditures Web Tables, Table 13, CTR. FOR

AND
MEDICAID
SERVICES
(CMS),
(2006), available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/ downloads/tables.pdf (last
visited Feb. 14, 2006).
64 See, e.g., Thomas L. Gift et al., Is Healthy Competition Healthy?
New
Evidence of the Impact ofHospital Competition, 39 INQUIRY 45, 53 (2002).
65 See 42 CFR § 1001.701(a)(1).
66 While CMS has issued proposed regulations clarifying that providers
MEDICARE

may offer reduced or free care to uninsured or underinsured patients, it has not
yet finalized them. See, e.g., Medicare and Federal Healthcare Programs: Fraud
and Abuse; Clarification of Terms and Application of Program Exclusion
Authority for Submitting Claims Containing Excessive Charges, 68 Fed. Reg.
53939, 53941 (proposed Sept. 15, 2003) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001).
Nevertheless, it issued a notice in 2005, instructing providers that:
No OIG [Office of the Inspector General] authority, including the
Federal anti-kickback statute, prohibits or restricts hospitals from
offering discounts to uninsured patients who are unable to pay their
hospital bills. In addition, the OIG has never excluded or attempted to
exclude any provider or supplier for offering discounts to uninsured or
underinsured patients under the permissive exclusion authority at
section 1128(b)(6)(A) of the Act.
OIG Supplemental Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 70 Fed. Reg.
4858-01, 4872-73 (Jan. 31, 2005). Providers may therefore offer free or
reduced-fee care to patients who are uninsured or underinsured without fear of
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fewer incentives to give free or reduced-cost care to patients,
whether in the ED or elsewhere.
III. POLICY ISSUES INVOLVING EMTALA: ACCESS TO CARE AND
OVERCROWDING

EMTALA was enacted in the midst of significant changes in
the organization and financing of healthcare and health insurance.
At the time, charity care was waning while, simultaneously, the
need for such care was rising. Meanwhile, medicine as a large and
rapidly growing business was on the upswing. Yet EMTALA, as
we shall see, harkens to an older era, one in which medical
altruism arguably played a stronger role than it does today. This
contrast has contributed to medical, social, and economic
discomfort with the Act, which in turn has led to the scapegoating
of the Act as the cause of a variety of social and economic ills
within healthcare.
EMTALA, contrary to conventional wisdom, does not appear
to be a significant cause of any of these problems. Rather, as we
shall see, EMTALA provides a lens through which other, more
widespread issues with our healthcare system become magnified.
A. EMTALA and Access to Healthcare
Patient dumping, where it occurs, can be a serious problem for
the health and safety of public-pay and uninsured patients.
Congress clearly intended EMTALA to help ameliorate this
problem. EMTALA was meant to provide an "adequate first
response to a medical crisis" for all ED patients and to "send a
clear signal to the hospital community ...that all Americans,
regardless of wealth or status, should know that a hospital will
provide what services it can when they are truly in physical
distress." 67 The American public generally expects that everyone
can at least receive emergency medical care when necessary,
reprisal from CMS, whether through reduction of their "usual charges," or
through exclusion from Medicare. Id.
67

Dole).

131 CONG. REc. S13904 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1985) (statement of Sen. Bob
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regardless of his or her ability to pay, as it literally can mean the
difference between life and either sudden death or severe
disability. EMTALA codified that expectation, based on the
longstanding ethical duty of healthcare providers to give charity
care. Yet it did so at a time when not only the need for charity care
was increasing due to a rising lack of health insurance, but also
physicians' and hospitals' abilities to provide such care without
substantial economic pain was declining due to changes in
reimbursement.
The ED provides ready medical and surgical assistance for
those who lack a regular source of care. Both lack of health
insurance and racial minority status independently correlate with a
dearth in regular sources of care. 68 As recently as the 1970s, the
vast majority of the American public had access to some form of
health insurance, whether public or private. In 1970, approximately
94% of Americans under age sixty-five had at least partial
coverage. 69 In the mid-1970s, however, this began to change as
healthcare costs rose at double-digit rates. By 1992, 15% of the
U.S. population was uninsured.7 0 This percentage remained
relatively static or rose throughout the 1990s and into the present
century. 71 By 2004, 45.8 million 72Americans were uninsured,
comprising 15.6% of the population.
68

Marsha Lillie-Blanton & Catherine Hoffman, The Role of Health

Insurance Coverage in Reducing Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Healthcare, 24
HEALTH AFFAIRS 198 (2005).

See Evolution of PresentPrivate Health Insurance Coverage, 51 CONG.
DIG. 34, 35 (1972).
70 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Historic Health Insurance Tables,
Table HI-i
(2004),
available
at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/historic/
69

hihisttl .html (last viewed Feb. 24, 2006).
71 Id. While the percentage appears to drop starting in 1999, this is due to a
change in how the uninsured were calculated in the 2000 census. See ROBERT J.
MILLS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: 2001, 20 (2002),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p60-220.pdf (last visited
Feb. 9, 2006).
72

CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT

ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME,
POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2004, 16 (2005),

available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p60-229.pdf
Feb. 9, 2006).

(last visited
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People of color are also more likely to be uninsured. While
people of color comprised 34% of the U.S. population in 2003,
they accounted for 52% of the uninsured.73 A number of studies
examining different populations in the U.S. have found a
correlation between
lack of a regular source of healthcare and
74
increased ED use.
Teasing apart the separate impact of race and perceived or
actual economic status on the access and receipt of emergency care
can be difficult. 75 The widespread integration of private hospitals
in the late 1960s did not solve all the problems with respect to
either racial or economic prejudice in the provision of health
services. 76 Now, the problems are, as David Barton Smith notes,
"subtler and more difficult to untangle from the economic
imperatives faced by providers. 77 The 1960s saw a rise in the
number of cases brought against hospitals for failure to provide
emergency medical care. 78 A number of studies have additionally
73 MILLS,

supra note 71, at 199.

See, e.g., David C. Brousseau et al., Association Between Infant
Continuity of Care and Pediatric Emergency Department Utilization, 113
74

738, 739-40 (2004); William G. Johnson & Mary E. Rimsza, The
Effects of Access to Pediatric Care and Insurance Coverage on Emergency
Department Utilization, 113 PEDIATRICS 483, 484 (2004); Roger A. Rosenblatt
et al., The Effect of the Doctor-PatientRelationship on Emergency Department
Use Among the Elderly, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 97, 98 (2000).
75 See, e.g., David Mechanic, Disadvantage,Inequality, and Social Policy,
21 HEALTH AFFAIRS 48, 54 (2002).
76 As recently as the 1950s, African-Americans, among certain other races,
had few options for hospital care, other than in county hospitals and, where they
existed, historically black hospitals. Following Medicare's implementation in
1966, President Lyndon Johnson launched a Medicare Title VI certification
effort, in which hospitals were required to integrate in order to qualify for
Medicare reimbursement. Economics won out over prejudice. According to
David Barton Smith, "more than 1,000 hospitals quietly integrated their medical
staffs, waiting rooms, and hospital floors in less than four months." See David
Barton Smith, Racial and Ethnic Health Disparitiesand the UnfinishedHealth
Agenda, 24 HEALTH AFFAIRS 317, 319-20 (2004).
77 DAvI BARTON SMITH, HEALTHCARE DIVIDED 335 (Univ. of Mich.
Press, 1999).
78 See, e.g., Richard v. Adair Hosp. Found. Corp., 566 S.W.2d 791 (Ky.
App. 1978); Fabian v. Matzko, 344 A.2d 569 (Pa. Super. 1975); Hill v. Ohio
PEDIATRICS
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found both racial and class-related disparities in care provided to
those patients who successfully obtained medical care in EDs.79
Given the disproportionate ED use in minority communitiesparticularly in poor African American and Latino communitiesintentional and unintentional discrimination historically has been
to be a real issue in the provision of emergency
and continues
°
care.
EMTALA has improved but not solved these problems. There
exist numerous horror stories of physicians and hospitals that
refused to evaluate or treat very sick patients due to a real or
perceived lack of health insurance or other impermissible issues,
even following the passage of the statute.81 When properly
Cty., 468 S.W.2d 306 (Ky. App. 1970); Standurfv. Sipes, 447 S.W.2d 558 (Mo.
1969); Ruvio v. N. Broward Hosp. Dist., 186 So. 2d 45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1966). Note that the rise in published cases of course may not mirror a rise in
actionable events, but rather may reflect other factors, such as increasing
visibility of the issue or increased access to the courts for plaintiffs in such
cases.
79 See, e.g., Janice C. Blanchard et al., Racial and Ethnic Disparities in
Health: An Emergency Medicine Perspective, 10 AcAD. EMERGENCY MED.
1289 (2003); Jeffrey J. Bazarian et al., Ethnic and Racial Disparities in
Emergency Department Care for Mild Traumatic Brain Injury, 10 ACAD.
EMERGENCY MED. 1209 (2003); Arvind Venkat, The Impact of Race on the
Acute Management of ChestPain, 10 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 1199 (2003).
80 See, e.g., Patrick H. Tyrance et al., Emergency Department Costs: No
Emergency, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1866 (1996).
81 See, e.g., Mark Taylor, EMTALA Cases Slowing Down, 34 MOD.
HEALTHCARE 19 (July 26, 2004). To take just one example, in the late 1980s, a
California physician turned away a Romani (gypsy) man at the ED who had
likely just had a heart attack. In defense of his action, the physician claimed that
when a Romani comes to the ED, scores of their family members also come,
filling the waiting room, loitering, picking pockets and generally causing a
ruckus. They also, the physician claimed, tend not to be insured. On the strength
of his negative stereotypes about Roma, the physician told the man (and his
numerous family members) to go to another hospital, several miles away. The
man died en route to the second hospital. No charges were ever filed against
either the physician or the hospital (although the physician recounted having to
call security for protection, as the man's relatives later returned to the hospital
with knives, seeking revenge). Interview with Anonymous Physician (1992).
Note that the Supreme Court ruled that proof of improper motive (such as those
evidenced in this example) is not necessary in order to make out an EMTALA
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enforced, EMTALA can help prevent such incidents from taking
place, and punish them when they do occur.
EMTALA is admittedly direct, and thus, in a certain sense,
intuitive. If the problem is conceived simply as a failure of
physicians and hospitals to carry out their charitable duties with
respect to the poor, then EMTALA accomplishes the task.
According to the congressional record, it appears that Congress
perceived the provision of emergency care to indigents as a
professional or moral obligation on healthcare providers that some
were shirking. The existence of such an obligation is nothing new.
Physicians have had an ethical obligation since at least the Middle
Ages to provide general charity care. 82 It was first formalized for
allopathic physicians in the United States in the 1847 American
Medical Association (AMA) Code of Ethics. 83 While the Code
notes that "the office of physician can never be supported as an
exclusively beneficent one," it prohibits physicians from providing
free care to the affluent, suggests that payment should be
conditioned on the ability of the patient to pay, and states that
physicians should "cheerfully and freely" provide free care to the
indigent. 84 Drawing on this history, the House Committee Report
on EMTALA remarked that it "want[ed] to provide a strong
assurance that pressures for greater hospital efficiency are not to be
construed as license to ignore traditional community
85
responsibilities and loosen historic standards."
One could question whether EMTALA would be enacted again
today, if nothing had been done in 1985 and if we were today faced
with the same evidence and public opinion regarding the matter as
we were in the 1980s. It is not merely a matter of the policy
choices currently being made by Congress and the present federal
Administration. Rather, it has more to do with the gradual shift this
country has seen in its conception of healthcare and those who
violation. See Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, 525 U.S. 249, 253 (1999).
82 See, e.g., Karen Geraghty, The Obligation to Provide Charity Care, in
PROFESSING MEDICINE
83

Id. at 57-58.

57 (American Medical Ass'n eds., 2002).

American Medical Ass'n (AMA) Code of Medical Ethics, Ch. II, Art. V,
§ 9; Ch. III, Art. I, § 3 (May 1847).
84

85 H.R. Rep. 99-241(I) (July 31, 1985).
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provide care over the past five decades or so.
Healthcare has, in this country, always had a shared status as a
commodity and as a public good. The 1847 AMA Code of Ethics
demonstrates this tension: physicians, who rely for their livelihood
upon payment for the services they provide, are nevertheless
ethically obliged to provide charity care to those in need.86 The
balance between the two has shifted variously over the years.
During the past five decades in particular, this balance has tilted far
more towards the "commodity" end of the scale, although the
conception of healthcare as a public good still exists. 87 As noted
above, charity care has substantially waned in the face of
significant alterations in physician and hospital reimbursement.88
At the same time, federal and state governments are increasingly
seeking to pull back from guaranteed rights to healthcare for
certain members of the population. 89 Even the current AMA Code
of Ethics no longer obligates physicians to provide free care to the
indigent. 90 Nevertheless, some physicians do still provide charity
care, and the United States still guarantees, at least for now, a
certain amount of healthcare to particular classes of low-income,
elderly, disabled or indigent individuals.
It is likely that concern for the indigent and those with public
insurance was not the only force behind approval of EMTALA.
Patients had been turned away from private EDs due to lack of
insurance long before EMTALA was ever contemplated. 91 While
86

See AMA Code of Medical Ethics, Ch. II, Art. V, § 9; Ch. III, Art. I, § 3.

87

See generally John V. Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance, 30 U.C.

L. REV. 311 (1997); David M. Frankford, Privatizing Healthcare:
Economic Magic to Cure Legal Medicine, 66 So. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1992).
88 See supra notes 61-66 and associated text.
89 The increased use of Section 1115 waivers in Medicaid, particularly with
DAVIS

respect to defined contribution plans such as that presently being implemented
in Florida and considered elsewhere, forms one aspect of this phenomenon. See,
e.g., John V. Jacobi, Dangerous Times for Medicaid, 33 J. L. MED. ETHICS 834,
838-41 (2005).
90 Rather, it instead mandates that "a physician shall support access to
medical care for all people," without specifying the manner in which a physician
should carry out that duty. See AMA Principles of Medical Ethics, IX (2001).
9' See, e.g., Lisa M. Enfield & David P. Sklar, Patient Dumping in the
HospitalEmergency Department: Renewed Interest in an Old Problem, 8 AM. J.

EMTALA AND EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS

715

many states had adopted laws prohibiting certain transfers or
requiring EDs to provide a minimum of care to all comers, the
majority of states had not yet done so by the time EMTALA was
enacted.92 The problem that came to a head in the 1980s was not
merely that uninsured and publicly insured patients were unable to
receive medical care in emergencies, and suffered serious injuries
or death as a result. This indeed was true, and unquestionably
concerned Congress. 93 However, there was another concern.
Patients who were turned away from private EDs were often
redirected to EDs at public hospitals, or otherwise ultimately
showed up there for treatment. 94 Public hospitals have a legal duty
to provide care for the indigent, and traditionally serve Medicare
and Medicaid patients, among others. The cost of care for
uninsured and underinsured patients seen at public hospitals
largely comes out of local, and to a lesser extent, state and federal
coffers.95 Congress, when debating the act, was arguably aware of
this issue, despite the fact that it does not appear that Congress
expressly considered any hard figures concerning the public cost of
caring for these patients. 96 Congress was further aware that
L. & MED. 561, 567 (1988) (noting that, under the common law of most states,
hospitals were generally allowed to refuse to initiate care for a prospective
patient, no matter how dire the person's need).
92 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. 99-241, pt. 3, at 6 (discussing Pub. Law
99-272)
(1986).
93 131 CONG. REC. S13892-01 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1985) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy).
94 See Schiffet al., supra note 6; Himmelstein et al., supra note 11.
95 Unlike the local share, in particular, the federal share is indirect, and
usually comes in the form of Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments.
Note as well that, in 1983, Congress considered providing $52 million to public
hospitals to help cover emergency medical care expenses for indigent patients,
but ultimately declined to do so. See H.R. Conf. Rept. 98-44 (discussing Pub.
Law 98-8) (Mar. 21, 1983).
96 See, e.g., 131
CONG. REc. S13892-01 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1985)
(statement of Sen. Durenberger); 132 CONG. REc. E 177 (daily ed. Mar. 11,
1986) (statement of Rep. Stark). At least two senators expressly observed in
their statements concerning the act that Medicare's prospective payment system,
as well as changes geared towards instilling more competition in the healthcare
market, would result in less fat in the system, and accordingly less charity care.
131 CONG. REc. S13892-01 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1985) (statements of Senators
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EMTALA was merely a stopgap measure, a way of ensuring that
the growing millions of uninsured and publicly insured Americans
were able to obtain care in a genuine medical emergency without
requiring a complete overhaul of the American system of
healthcare insurance and finance. 97 As such, EMTALA not only
helped guarantee that the uninsured and publicly insured could
receive care in an emergency, but also that the cost of providing
such care was borne by both the private and public sectors.
B. EMTALA, ED Overcrowding and FinancialConstraints
Some physicians and other commentators allege that EMTALA
has led to a sharp increase in "inappropriate" ED use by the
uninsured and others. Since even the indigent must at least be
given a medical screening examination if they present at an ED
with a medical complaint, the conventional wisdom is that the
indigent are to blame for problems with ED overuse and
insolvency. 98 One commentator notes that,
Since EMTALA was enacted, emergency department use
has surged from 85 million visits per year to almost 110
million visits per year, while more than 550 hospitals and
1,100 EDs closed, as did many trauma centers, maternity
wards, and tertiary referral centers. Ninety percent of the
remaining trauma centers are currently overwhelmed.
Ninety percent of our larger hospitals have saturated their

Durenberger and Proxmire).
97 131 CONG. REC. S13892-01 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1985) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy).
[T]he environment of medical practice is changing dramatically.
Hospitals are insecure about their futures. They are more reluctant than
before to offer care for which they may not be compensated. At the
same time, there are more people who have no health insurance and
cannot pay for healthcare. These larger problems demand solutions. But
we must not wait for complete solutions. It is imperative that all
emergencies be treated appropriately today.
Id.
98

See, e.g., Robert A. Bitterman, Explaining the EMTALA Paradox, 40
470,470-75 (2002).
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capacity for treating patients, primarily because of the lack
of inpatient critical care beds and the nurses to staff them.
Emergency medical services (EMS) diversion is rampant,
most EDs are overcrowded, waiting times have increased
33%, and the number of individuals seeking emergency
care who leave the ED before being seen has tripled in
some areas of the country. Liability costs are soaring and
malpractice insurance may not even be available in many
states, such
as Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Nevada, and
99
Florida.
If only EMTALA had not been enacted, so the conventional
wisdom goes, these problems would either not exist, or would be
substantially reduced.' 00
This perception has been widespread. In 1992, the U.S. Senate
asked the General Accounting Office (GAO) to do a national study
of the problem of overcrowding in hospital EDs. 1° 1 It was an
opinion study, measuring the beliefs of administrators and others
within the emergency department only. The study found that those
surveyed believed the problem to be caused largely by people
seeking non-urgent care. 10 2 According to the data in the GAO

99 Id. (citations omitted).
100 See, e.g., Robert Schafermeyer et al., Political Issues in Emergency

Medicine: The United States, 16 EMERG. MED. AUSTRALASIA 183, 186-88
(2004); Bruce Siegel, The Emergency Department: Rethinking the Safety Net for
Net,
HEALTH
AFFAIRS
(Mar.
24,
2004),
at
the
Safety

http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/ful/hlthaff.w4.146v 1/DC 1?maxtosho
w-&HITS= 10&hits = 10&RESULTFORMAT=&authorl =siegel&fulltext-emtal
a&andorexactfulltext-and&searchid = 1140124486899 3572&FIRSTINDEX=0
&resourcetype=l &journalcode=healthaff (last visited Feb. 16, 2006); V. George
Velianoff, Overcrowding and Diversion in the Emergency Department: The
HealthcareSafety Net Unravels, 37 NURSING CLINICS N. AM. 59 (2002).

101Lynne D. Richardson et al., Emergency Department Crowding as a
Health Policy Issue: Past Development, Future Directions, 40 ANN.
EMERGENCY MED. 388, 388-93 (2002) (citing U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS: UNEVENLY AFFECTED BY GROWTH AND

IN

CHANGE

PATIENT

USE

(Jan.

1993),

available

at

http://161.203.16.4/d36tl 1/148331.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2002)) [hereinafter
EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS].
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report, 43% of all ED patients in 1990 had illnesses or injuries
classified as non-urgent, particularly those seen in rural or small
EDs. 10 3 Uninsured and Medicaid patients were believed to have
significantly accounted for much of the growth in non-urgent ED
use. 104 88% of the patients with non-emergent conditions allegedly
went to the ED even though they had other sources of healthcare
available in the community.'°5 Emergency departments cited a lack
of a primary care physician as the reason for ED use in 42% of the
non-urgent cases they saw in 1990.106 If based on hard data, that
would amount to fifteen million inappropriate ED visits in one year
alone. 10 7 According to the report, 37% of ED patients who did not
have a primary care provider in 1990 were either uninsured or on
Medicaid. 10 8 Particularly in rural areas, patients with a primary
care provider used EDs for after-hours non-urgent0 care. 10 9 Delays
in care were most often seen in large urban EDs. 1
103

Id. at 4, 20. Emergent conditions totaled 17 percent. The remaining 40

percent of cases constituted time-sensitive urgent conditions. Id. at 19.
104 Id. at 19. Hospitals also cited an increase in the use of EDs by the
elderly and an increase in serious illnesses and injuries as major factors in the
increase in ED use. Id.
105 Id. at 4-5.
106 Id. at 21.
107 Id. There were approximately 38 million ED visits in 1990. Id
'08 EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS, supranote 101, at 5.
109 Id.
110

Id. at 6. Note, on the other hand, that a recent study shows that, contrary

to popular belief, ED overcrowding is caused in part by a significant increase in
the rate of ED use by privately insured patients, not by uninsured patients. The
rate of ED use for the uninsured rose at a rate comparable to Medicare
patients--about 10 percent-when comparing the years 1996-1997 and 20002001. See Cunningham & May, supra note 14, at 2; see also, e.g., Stephen
Zuckerman & Yu-Chu Shen, Characteristics of Occasional and Frequent
Emergency Department Users: Do Insurance Coverage and Access to Care
Matter?, 42 MED. CARE 176 (Feb. 2004) (finding that "[tihe uninsured do not
use more ED visits than the insured population as is sometimes argued"). ED
use by those with private insurance increased, on the other hand, by 24 percent,
even though the number of individuals who were privately insured increased
only 4.1 percent over the same period. See Cunningham & May, supra note 14,
at 2. Given that approximately two-thirds of the American public is covered by
private health insurance, this indicates that the insured, rather than the
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Despite the 1992 GAO report's conclusion that ED
overcrowding was largely due to an increase in non-urgent,
uninsured patients, the actual cause of overcrowding appears to be
multi-factorial, and may not in fact stem significantly from
EMTALA's enactment at all. First, while the volume of ED
patients has increased at a higher rate than has the U.S. population
since EMTALA was enacted, this trend is nothing new. ED visits
in 2000 through 2001 had increased 16.3% over visits in 1996
through 1997, whereas the total population had increased only
4.4% during the same time."' This parallels a trend observed
earlier in the 1990s. 112 Yet if one looks back even further, one

finds that this trend has a much longer history, predating
EMTALA by at least a few decades. 13 According to at least one
study, per capita ED visit rates rose 550% between 1955 and 1980,
as compared with a 30% per capita increase in hospital inpatient
use during the same time period and no appreciable per capita
increase in physician office visits. 114 Additionally, a more recent

study using national statistics from patient encounters rather than
opinion data found that it is largely privately insured and Medicaid
patients who are most responsible for the rising numbers." 5 This
study found that patients with private health insurance or Medicare
accounted for nearly 66% of the increase in ED visits between the
study years of 1996 through 1997 and 2001 through 2002.116
Population increase in general accounted for 25% of the increase in
visits. 117 Visits by the uninsured, conversely, accounted for only

uninsured, may significantly be contributing to ED overcrowding.

111 See Cunningham & May, supra note 14, at 2. See also Wanerman, supra
note 12.
112 See, e.g., GAO, EMERGENCY CARE, supra note 29, at 9.
113 See, e.g., Jerry E. Bishop, Data Shows Decline in Annual Increase in
HospitalEmergency Room Use, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 1977, at X (reporting that
ED use had increased only by 6 percent in 1976, as compared to average annual
increases of 14 percent in the early 1970s).
114 See, e.g., Kevin F. O'Grady, et al., The Impact of Cost Sharing on
Emergency Department Use, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 484 (Aug. 22, 1985).
"5 See, e.g., Cunningham & May, supra note 14.
116 Id. at 1.
117 Id.
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about 11% of the increase. 1 8 Emergent or urgent visits accounted
for 47% of the visits during the study period, with semi-urgent,
non-urgent and visits
of unknown triage classification accounting
9
for the remainder. 1

Second, during the 1990s in particular, the total number of
hospitals and EDs declined in an effort to cut costs and "improve
efficiency": e.g., promote a high census, or hospital occupancy
rate. 12 Unoccupied beds earn no revenue and cost the hospital
money to maintain staff and other operating costs. This is a
particularly significant consideration for both nonprofit and forprofit hospitals, both of which compete in an often aggressive
healthcare market, with hospital chains increasingly taking hold in
the 1990s.121 Accordingly, the number of inpatient beds declined in
18 Id. at

2.

119 Id. at 3. Medicare patients are an exception here, with 57 percent of their
visits in this study reported to be emergent. Id. Note that, because approximately
25 percent of all ED visits were of unknown triage classification, it is possible
that more visits were in fact of an emergent or urgent nature than captured by
the data. See id.
120 Wanerman, supra note 12, at 461 (citing AMERICAN HOSPITAL Ass'N,
Emergency Departments - An Essential Access Point to Care, TRENDWATCH
(Mar. 2001)); AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASS'N (AHA), CRACKS IN THE
FOUNDATION: AVERTING A CRISIS IN AMERICA'S HOSPITALS 4 (Aug. 2002)
[hereinafter CRACKS IN THE FOUNDATION]. The notion that EMTALA may be
financially responsible for the hospital and ED closures cited above may be
misplaced. At least one study indicates that, while they lost an average of $84
per ED patient in 2002, California hospitals may have recouped those losses
from the additional revenue they gained through hospital admissions from the
ED, which averaged $1,220 in profit per patient. See GLENN A. MELNICK ET AL.,
CALIFORNIA'S EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS: Do THEY CONTRIBUTE TO HOSPITAL

2
(2003),
available
at
http://www.chcf.org/
topics/view.cfln?itemlD=21192. The study in question, however, did not
evaluate public and private EDs separately, and also omitted Level I trauma
centers, which are more likely to be in major urban centers and be part of a
public hospital. As such, it may overstate the average revenues generated at
hospitals that see predominantly more uninsured and public-pay patients,
notwithstanding EMTALA.
121 For more on the growth of hospital chains, see David Blumenthal & Joel
S. Weissman, Selling Teaching Hospitals to Investor-Owned Hospital Chains:
Three Case Studies, 19 HEALTH AFFAIRS 158, 158 (2000); Jack Needleman et
al., HospitalConversion Trends, 16 HEALTH AFFAIRS 187, 188-91 (1997).
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this period-as they have, in fact, historically in most years since
hitting a peak of 1.7 million in 1965.122 The decline in inpatient
beds means fewer beds are available to acutely ill patients admitted
through the ED, who must then wait in the ED for an inpatient bed
to become available.' 2 3 It is the acutely ill patients, moreover, who
consume the largest share of ED time and resources. 124 The child
with a mild upper respiratory ailment, on the other hand, ultimately
requires far less of an ED provider's time, as well as ED bed space.
The percentage of severely ill patients seeking care through the
ED is on the rise. 12 5 Fewer inpatient beds, in conjunction with
increased ED use and increased severity in the types of conditions
seen, can translate into longer waiting periods for those seeking
semi-urgent or non-urgent care in EDs and more instances of EDs
being put on "drive-by" status, in which they reach full capacity
and can accept no further ambulance admissions. 126 The current
nursing shortage in many areas compounds the problem, with an
average nationwide vacancy
rate of 13%. 127 Beds that are not
128
staffed cannot be used.
Third, several recent studies indicate that the increase in ED
use in recent years is not predominantly due to visits by the
uninsured seeking help for non-emergent conditions. Rather,
122

AHA, HOSPITAL

123

Robert W. Derlet, Overcrowding in Emergency Departments:Increased

STATISTICS 2 (2003).

Demand and Decreased Capacity, 39 ANN. EMERGENCY MED. 430, 431 (Apr.
2002). This is true, despite evidence that the number of ED beds increased in
California, at least, during the 1990s, despite the decline in the total number of
both hospitals and EDs in the state. See, e.g., MELNICK, supra note 120; Susan
Lambe et al., Trends in the Use and Capacity of California's Emergency
Departments, 1990 - 1999, 39 ANN. EMERGENCY MED. 389, 393 (Apr. 2002).
124 See, e.g., Grant D. Innes et al., Prospective Time Study Derivation of
Emergency Physician Workload Predictors, 7 CAN. J. EMERGENCY MED. 299,
303-04 (2005).
125 See, e.g., Robert W. Derlet & John R. Richards, Emergency
Department
Overcrowding in Florida,New York and Texas, 95 SO. MED. J. 848 (Aug. 2002).
126 See, e.g., Stephen Trzeciak & E. P. Rivers, Emergency Department
Overcrowding in the United States: An Emerging Threat to Patient Safety and
Public Health, 20 EMERGENCY MED. J. 402, 403-04 (2003).
127 See CRACKS IN THE FOUNDATION, supra note 120, at 2.
128 See, e.g., Derlet, supra note 123, at 431.
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insured patients are largely the ones using the ED in this way.1
As the privately insured greatly outnumber the uninsured, the
impact of the increase in privately insured patients is
correspondingly larger.' 30 Patients often seek non-emergent care at
the ED because they cannot take time off of work during regular
business hours to see their regular doctor or because they wish to
see a doctor more quickly than they could if they scheduled an
appointment with their regular provider.' With the loosening of
curbs by managed care organizations, providers also feel
increasingly free to refer patients to EDs. 132 These visits are

predominantly non-urgent. 133

For some who would like to lay blame for ED overcrowding,
EMTALA is a convenient target. As noted above, Congress, by
enacting EMTALA, imposed a requirement of charity care on
private physicians and hospitals.1 34 In the decades prior to
EMTALA, charity care was a voluntary undertaking on the part of
healthcare providers, one they performed as a matter of
professional pride and custom. 135 By requiring private EDs to
screen anyone who presents in the ED for an emergency medical
129 According to one study, while the number of uninsured seeking care at

EDs did in fact increase between 1996 and 2001 by 10.3 percent, the percentage
of privately insured patients seeking ED care increased far more significantly,
by 24.3 percent during the same time period. Cunningham & May, supra note
14, at 3.
130 In 2004, 15.7 percent of the U.S. population was uninsured, whereas
68.1 percent was privately insured (through employment or otherwise).
DENAVAS-WALT, supra note 72, at 16.
131See, e.g., id. This is not a new phenomenon, either. See, e.g., Howard R.
Kelman & Dorothy S. Lane, Use of the HospitalEmergency Room in Relation to
the Use of Private Physicians, 66 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 1189, 1190 (1976)
(finding that 51 percent of suburban individuals seeking care in EDs had a
regular primary care physician (PCP), but came to the ED because the physician
was not available at the time that care was needed, and that a further 15 percent
were referred by their PCP because they needed services that the PCP did not
offer).
132 Cunningham & May, supra note 14, at 3.
133

Id.
134 See supra Section III.A.

135 See id.
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condition and to provide care to anyone with such a condition,
regardless of their ability to pay, Congress turned a once-voluntary
undertaking into a compulsory one. Without an internalization of
Congress' mandate, providers, who might at one time willingly
have provided at least some charity care through EDs, may resent
their perceived loss of autonomy.' 36 As such, they may be more
likely to characterize matters such as poor revenues, loss of ED
staff, and overcrowding as EMTALA's inevitable fallout.
Additionally, EMTALA unintentionally invites scapegoating of
the poor and uninsured. The statute itself provides no method or
funds for compensating providers for any free care they may
render in its compliance. Medicare and Medicaid provide a small
amount of compensation to help offset losses incurred through
treating the indigent and providing emergency medical care to
illegal immigrants, but the compensation is partial and indirect,
and goes only to hospitals rather than to physicians or other
individual providers.' 37 Physicians and hospitals complain that the
uninsured and Medicaid patients are deliberately taking advantage
of EMTALA's directive to screen patients regardless of their
ability to pay and that these patients clog EDs with routine medical
problems.1 38 Employers who provide health insurance to their
employees complain that their premiums are sharply rising in part
to subsidize healthcare provided to the growing ranks of the
uninsured and publicly insured. 139 If one took such reports as true
and looked no further, one might start to think that if only the
uninsured and publicly insured would simply take responsibility
for their own healthcare costs, ED overcrowding and healthcare
premium inflation would ease, state and federal budget crises
would cease, and the U.S. public could happily and responsibly
enjoy the fruits of marvelous medical advances, many of which
136 See, e.g., Roger J. Lewis, Academic Emergency Medicine and the

"Tragedy of the Commons," 11 ACAD. EMERG. MED. 423 (2004).
137 See, e.g., Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization
Act ("Medicare Modernization Act"), Pub. L. 108-173, Title X, § 1011, 117
Stat. 2432 (Dec. 8, 2003).

138 See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 136.
139 See, e.g., Stan Freeman, Legislature,Employers Struggle with Insurance

Issue, THE

REPUBLICAN,

Feb. 5, 2006, at 31.
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would be within the reach of most people's budgets.
Unfortunately, it is not that simple. Some once thought that the
enactment of Medicare and Medicaid was the first incremental step
towards universal coverage of all Americans. 40 As noted earlier,
in 1970 nearly all Americans enjoyed some form of health
coverage, largely through the private market.14 1 Perhaps more
Americans at that time had health insurance because they were
more responsible and prudent than they are today; however, this is
not likely the case. Consistent double-digit increases in healthcare
costs and premiums, rather than a rapid lapse into irresponsibility,
contributed to the erosion of private coverage. 42 By 1977, nearly
14% of the population was uninsured. 143 The year before
EMTALA was enacted, over 17% of the U.S. public lacked health
insurance.144
Congress, having just experienced two major attempts to enact
some form of national health coverage in the prior decade,
expected EMTALA to merely be a short-term fix, something to
help tide the uninsured, underinsured and publicly insured through
medical emergencies until some form of expansive or universal
coverage had been enacted.145 Congress understood that the poor
and uninsured were not causing the problem of dumping, let alone
the problems of medical inflation and health insurance. Rather, the
poor and uninsured were the victims of these
problems. No one in
46
1
assistance.
for
need
their
debated
Congress
What would have happened had EMTALA not been enacted?
Particularly in those states in which private EDs had no legal
obligation to examine or treat uninsured and public-pay patients, it
140

See, e.g., ALAN DERICKSON, HEALTH SECURITY FOR ALL 136-37

(2005).
141 See supra note
69.
142
143

See supra notes 70-72 and associated text.
Randall R. Bovbjerg & William G. Kopit, Coverage and Care for the

Medically Indigent: Public and Private Options, 19

IND.

L. REv. 857, 860

(1986).
44 Id.
145 See supra note 97 and associated text.

See supra note 93 and associated text. It surely did not hurt that
EMTALA required no new federal expenditures.
146
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is conceivable that the shifting of the indigent emergency caseload
from private to public EDs would have increased whenever
possible. 147 Indigent and other patients whom the hospital or staff
found "undesirable" certainly would have suffered. Public
hospitals also would have suffered, even more than they do under
present conditions, as the shift could easily have
led to paralyzing
148
EDs.
their
in
care
seeking
patients
of
numbers
In such a case, one of three scenarios would likely have come
about. In the first scenario, the local, state, and/or federal
governments would have had to increase taxes significantly to
cover the increased volume and concordant shortfalls in public
hospital revenues. In the second scenario, many public hospitals
would have had to close, depriving millions of uninsured and
public-pay patients of a major source of healthcare. In the third
scenario, most remaining states would likely have enacted a
requirement that all hospitals with an ED must screen and, if
necessary, treat all patients presenting to their EDs with an
emergent condition. Either of the first two would likely have
significantly destabilized our predominantly private healthcare
system. The third might not have had significant efficacy, judging
by problems that were known to exist even in 1states
like Illinois,
49
decades.
for
effect
in
been
had
law
where such a
If any of the hypotheses given above are correct, even in part,
then EMTALA has acted as a safety valve for our present
healthcare system. Dumping still occurs and public hospitals still
treat a disproportionate number of uninsured and publicly insured
individuals in their EDs. Nonetheless, the public hospital system
continues to function and the uninsured and publicly insured
usually can obtain emergency care. This is the case in part because
private EDs and physicians are required to examine and, if
necessary, treat patients who present in EDs without regard to their
ability to pay, and the federal government can hold them
This may have been the result especially with the onset of the managed
care revolution that further reduced private-pay revenue.
148 Some would argue that we presently have reached such a situation. See,
147

e.g., Lewis, supra note 136.
149

See supra note 11 and associated text.
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responsible for failing to do so. 50 In exchange, our private system
of healthcare continues to exist, and private actors can continue to
reap significant profits from it. 151
IV.

SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

Entities can survive with inadequate revenues only for a
limited period of time. It may be that, by requiring hospitals and
physicians to evaluate and, if necessary, treat patients without
regard to compensation, Congress assumed that these healthcare
providers had sufficient revenues to pick up the added
responsibility without going bankrupt. Alternatively, Congress
may have deemed the loss of some healthcare providers to be
acceptable in the face of the problem of patient-dumping and the
desire to provide for the problem without taking any politically
unpalatable step such as raising taxes, cutting services elsewhere,
1 52
or taking up the issue of national health insurance yet again.
Whatever the rationale, however, the outcome is not reasonable.
The federal government ought to directly assist all affected
hospitals and healthcare providers in funding EMTALA, if
EMTALA's obligations are to continue. 153 While EMTALA's
goals should be supported, the federal government abdicated its
responsibility by allocating the burden of financing the obligation

IS0
151

See supra Section I.
That being said, little if any of the burden from EMTALA is felt by

some of the most profitable sectors of the private healthcare industry: managed
care entities and pharmaceutical companies. Regarding MCOs and EMTALA,
see infra Section IV.
152 For a discussion of the numerous attempts that have been made over the
last century to enact universal health coverage in the United States, see
DERICKSON, supranote 140.
153 While DSH payments from the federal government provide funds to

those hospitals serving a particularly large number of indigent patients, it does
not provide for every hospital serving the indigent through ED or other services.
Moreover, such payments do not provide for all or even most uncompensated
care even for those hospitals that do receive such payments, and the
Administration has threatened changes to the program that would effectively
reduce DSH payments from their present levels. See, e.g., Jacobi, supra note 89.
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to screen and treat onto hospitals and ED physicians. 154
The financial problems caused by EMTALA would further be
eased if the federal government required health insurers to pay for
emergency care using a "prudent layperson" standard.1 55 Many
managed care organizations (MCOs) require their subscribers to
obtain preauthorization for treatment. Such MCOs may refuse to
pay for emergency care in the absence of preauthorization,
claiming that it was medically unnecessary, that no emergency
156
condition existed, or that the hospital was out-of-network.
Because EMTALA prohibits EDs from delaying care to inquire
about health insurance status, many assume that they cannot call a
patient's insurer to request preauthorization, for fear of running
afoul of the statute. 157 Compounding this issue, CMS clearly
provides that hospitals must delay discussing with a patient
his or
158
treatment.
stabilizing
begins
it
after
her ability to pay until
The problem is mitigated in part, in that nearly all states require
health insurers to pay for emergency care, even where the patient
did not receive preauthorization for treatment.1 59 Most such laws
provide that, as long as a "prudent layperson" might have thought
the care to be urgent, given the patient's symptoms, the insurer

154

The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act

of 2003 takes a step towards compensating emergency departments and their
physicians for providing emergency care to undocumented aliens. From 20052008, the Act allocates $250 million to be distributed according to a formula to
compensate providers for treating undocumented aliens under EMTALA. See
supra note 137. It remains to be seen whether DSH payments will undergo a
corresponding reduction.
155 If the federal government were to enact such a provision, it would
circumvent the problem of ERISA preemption, unlike doing so at the state level.
For further discussion see, e.g., John D. Blum, Overcoming Managed Care
Regulatory Chaos Through a Restructured Federalism, I1 HEALTH MATRIX
327, 334-35 (2001).
156
157

See, e.g., GAO EMERGENCY CARE, supranote 29, at 13.
Recent changes to the regulations clarify that a physician or hospital

may seek authorization, but only after a screening examination has occurred and
stabilization has been initiated. See 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(d)(4)(ii) (West 2006).
158 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1); 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(d)(4).
159 See Mark A. Hall, The Impact and Enforcement of Prudent Layperson
Laws, 43 ANN.

EMERGENCY MED.

558 (2004).
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must pay. However, because of the preemption provisions of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), federal law
preempts such laws in their application to self-funded health
insurance plans sponsored by an employer.' 60 This is a significant
issue, because over half of all employees with employment-based
health insurance are covered by a self-funded plan. 16 1 Federal
regulation is therefore necessary in order to bring all privately
insured individuals under the protection of the prudent layperson
62
standard. 1

As noted above, hospital capacity significantly affects the flow
of patients through the ED and the number of inpatient beds has
been declining for decades.' 63 Patients who are admitted through
the ED must remain in the ED until an inpatient bed is free.' 64 If no
inpatient bed is free, then the patient unnecessarily consumes both
ED bed space and staff resources that could otherwise be used to
attend another patient.' 65 Yet, few hospitals will expand their
capacity if they are not certain the beds will be filled with
sufficient frequency to justify the expense.' 66 Such certainty is in
small supply at present, with declining public reimbursements and
continued pressure from insurers to minimize inpatient stays. 16
Additionally, in those areas in which hospitals are having difficulty
160

See, e.g., Blum, supra note 155, at 334-35.

161

See KAISER FAM. FOUND., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS:

SURVEY

2005

ANNUAL

109 (2005)

Prudent layperson standards have been proposed in a variety of federal
"patients' rights" bills proposed at the federal level but, to date, none have
passed, and passage looks increasingly unlikely as the HMO subscription rate
declines and other, more pressing matters intrude on Congress. For further
discussion see, e.g., Laura D. Hermer, Private Health Insurance in the United
States: A Proposalfor a More FunctionalSystem, 6 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL.
1 (2005).
163 See supra note 122 and associated text.
164 See supra notes 123-24 and associated text.
165 See id.
166 See, e.g., supra notes 120-21 and associated text.
167 For further discussion regarding declining public reimbursements, see
162

Jonathan Weisman, Tentative Agreement Reached on Budget, WASH. POST, Dec.
18, 2005 (discussing the 2006 budget, which level-funded physicians under
Medicare, narrowly averting a four percent cut that was supposed to be enacted).
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meeting their present staffing needs, they may be further unlikely
to seek to expand their number of inpatient beds, each of which
will require nursing and other staff support, not to mention further
infrastructure. Persuading hospitals with overburdened EDs to
expand their inpatient capacity would, absent new financial
incentives, be a difficult sell at best.
It might be suggested that hospitals could be encouraged, likely
through financial support or other means, to open and staff urgent
care centers near or adjacent to their EDs. 68 These centers would
specifically solicit patients in need of non-emergent care on a
walk-in basis, and would be open during early morning, evening
and weekend hours, as well as during regular business hours.
Nevertheless, such centers could allow non-emergency
patients to
1 69
self-select a more appropriate option for care.
This option would probably do little to solve ED woes,
however. On the positive side of the ledger, it might reduce the
patient volume in the ED waiting room, reduce wait times for nonurgent patients who self-selected to urgent care centers, and direct
non-emergent care to more appropriate resources. But encouraging
non-urgent patients to seek care elsewhere would likely not
significantly speed the flow of patients through the ED, as truly
170
emergent cases generally account for much of the hold up.
Additionally, private urgent care centers might cherry-pick the
168

Community health centers could also be opened for such purposes, with

expanded hours. However, they can be hampered by problems with funding and
insufficient staffing, among other issues. See, e.g., Jessamy Taylor, The
Fundamentals of Community Health Centers, NHPF BACKGROUND PAPER 17,
23
(Aug.
31,
2004),
available at www.communityclinics.org/
files/848 file NHPF_CHC Fundamentals.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2006).
169 Patients who chose to be seen through the emergency room would of
course need to be screened prior to being directed to the urgent care center, and
patients who came to the urgent care center would need to be screened and, if
necessary, stabilized pursuant to EMTALA's requirements. See CMS,
MEDICARE PROGRAM: CLARIFYING POLICIES RELATED TO THE RESPONSIBILITIES
OF MEDICARE-PARTICIPATING HOSPITALS IN TREATING INDIVIDUALS WITH
EMERGENCY
MEDICAL
CONDITIONS
60-62
(2003),
available at

new.cms.hhs.gov/EMTALA/Downloads/CMS-1063-F.pdf (last visited Feb. 17,
2006).
170 See supra notes 123-24 and associated text.
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well-insured patients from the poorly-insured or uninsured ones,
leaving the latter to obtain care from the ED. It makes little sense
to seek to improve EDs' financial and administrative outlooks by
draining better-paying patients from the ED.
While some of these proposals may offer small improvements,
they do not touch the heart of the problem. EMTALA is necessary
because our healthcare system leaves forty-five million Americans
without coverage.' 7 1 It is necessary because healthcare providers
commonly obtain more generous reimbursement from private
insurers than from Medicaid or Medicare.' 72 It is necessary
because our country has a long legacy of racial and economic
discrimination that, while certainly improved from prior decades,
still solidly
exists today, albeit often in more subtle forms than in
73
the past. 1
An expansion of public health insurance to cover more of those
who presently lack insurance would help matters, but only if
provider reimbursements were also raised. 74 For a more complete
solution, we must once again return to the prospect of some form
of national health coverage. Only when everyone has the same
baseline coverage for basic medical benefits, including emergency
care, will we genuinely see the problem of dumping, and of
blaming the poor and uninsured for our healthcare crises, dissipate.
Additionally, we may also need to reconsider the organization
and control of our hospital system. Voluntary associations such as
nonprofit hospitals are often conceived of as having a distinctly
and positively American flavor, largely due to decades of lobbying
by interested organizations. 175 Voluntary health entities
"encourage[] the individual to enter into associations and
organizations of his own choosing, encouraging the individual 1to
76
provide health protection for his family through his own effort.'
As such, they are "tied in not only with democracy and American
supra note 72, at 16.
172 See supra note 64 and associated text.
173 See supra notes 73-80 and associated text.
174 See, e.g., R. E. Santerre, The Inequity of MedicaidReimbursement in
the
United States, 1 APPLIED HEALTH ECON. & HEALTH POL'Y, 25, 31 (2002).
175 See, e.g., STEVENS, supra note 36, at 224.
171 See DENAVAS-WALT,

176 Id.
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177
initiative, but with other traditional structures of American life.
One probably could make similar claims now about for-profit
institutions, as well.
Yet, if we want to continue supporting such systems, we need
to understand that they come at a certain cost. With respect to
emergency services, many EDs will continue to experience
significant overcrowding and placement on drive-by status as
hospital bed capacity continues to diminish because of concerns
about profit maximization. 178 To help remain in the black, private
hospitals must maintain high occupancy rates, allowing for little
slack if a greater than expected number of patients need to be
admitted from the ED.179 More centralized public control and
funding of our hospital system would allow us to determine,
through an open and public process, whether we wish to commit
the additional revenue it would take to increase inpatient bed
capacity in areas regularly experiencing overcrowding and other
issues. 8 Seeking greater public control of our hospital system in
response to this one issue alone is surely excessive. Nevertheless,
we must add the issue of ED overcrowding and its causes to the list
of reasons we may want to rethink our present system of hospital
organization, control, and finance.
CONCLUSION

EMTALA was intended only to be a stopgap measure until
Congress finally succeeded in implementing universal or nearuniversal health coverage. 1 The crises in emergency care demand
attention. We can take a number of small steps to improve care and
reimbursement under EMTALA. Nevertheless, ED overcrowding,
177 Id.

178
179

180

See supra notes 120-24 and associated text.
See supra notes 120-21 and associated text.
Such a system is not, however, a panacea for the problem. See, e.g., D.

M. Fatovich et al., Access Block Causes Emergency Department Overcrowding
and Ambulance Diversion in Perth, Western Australia, 22 EMERGENCY MED. J.
351 (2005); Laura Eggertson, ED Problems Result of Bed Shortages, Doctors

Contend, 170 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 1653 (2004).
181 See supra note 97 and associated text.
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along with the ever-rising tide of the uninsured, suggest that
EMTALA can no longer stave off the need to revisit plans to
implement universal health coverage in this country.
In 2004, 45.8 million Americans, or 15.6% of the population,
were uninsured. 82 Medicaid covered another 12.4% of the
population.18 3 These individuals represent the bulk of the
"undesirables" in the U.S. healthcare system-those from whom
private hospitals and other providers can expect the least economic
return, and have the least interest in treating. While they may lack
resources, the uninsured are not the primary cause of the present
problems our emergency departments are experiencing. Rather, a
combination of factors, including increased ED use by both insured
and uninsured populations, an increase in the severity of illness
with which ED patients are presenting, and an inadequate supply
of available inpatient beds for ED patients who need to be
admitted, contribute significantly to the problem. Changes in
healthcare finance that have constricted the ability of providers to
shift costs from unprofitable to profitable ventures, and from the
poorly insured to the well insured, and that have thrown the
healthcare market open to increasing competition among private
providers, have placed further tensions on EDs. The solution to
these problems has little if anything to do with EMTALA itself.
Rather, they are symptoms of greater problems within the
healthcare system of this country.
There are, to be sure, smaller steps we can take to help
ameliorate certain problems with the provision of emergency care
in the United States. We can federally prohibit managed care
organizations from requiring preauthorization for care given in
EDs in order to be reimbursed. We can also expand eligibility and
improve provider reimbursements for our public healthcare
programs. But as long as we continue with our present largely
voluntary and private system of healthcare, we will continue to
face significant problems that impact well beyond ED
overcrowding. As noted in Congress two decades ago, EMTALA
was meant merely to be a stopgap measure to help protect some of
182

See DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 72, at 16.

183

See id. Medicare covered 13.7 percent. Id.
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the most vulnerable members of our populace until we overhauled
our system of health insurance and healthcare organization and
finance. It is time once again to set ourselves to this task.
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